

## CFFO FELLOW PAPERS | No. 1

A Series edited by **Roland Deiser**

---

# Customer Centricity

Four Big Decisions, Not Just One

*An argument by **Bernie Jaworski***

*challenged, sharpened, and extended  
through dialogue with scholars and executives  
convened by the Center for the Future of Organization*

March 2026

A Note on the Featured Fellow Series	2
Featured Fellow Profile	3
1   The Provocation	4
2   What the Dialogue Produced	8
3   Open Questions	15

## A Note on the CFFO Featured Fellow Series

Insights that create impact do not emerge in isolation. They get tested, challenged, and sharpened through dialogue – between disciplines, between thinkers and practitioners, between a carefully developed argument and the organizational realities it has to survive.

The CFFO Fellow Paper series is designed around that conviction. Each paper begins with a “provocation” (a conceptual argument) by one of the Center's Senior Fellows and moves through two structured stages of collaborative enrichment: a cross-disciplinary peer discussion that challenges the argument's foundations, and a conversation with senior executives that grounds it in the realities of organizational life. What the Fellow originally wrote remains visible throughout, so the reader can trace not just the argument, but what the process of dialogue produced.

In the first stage, a cross-disciplinary group of scholars and advisors from the Center for the Future of Organization (CFFO) engages with the provocation in the spirit of co-development. Different disciplines bring different lenses to the topic, examining assumptions and extending the argument in the process. The idea is to widen the intellectual range.

In the second stage, the amplified argument moves into dialogue with practice. A curated group of senior executives from the Center's partner network tests and applies the ideas in the context of practice, identifying where the framework meets friction and contributing insights beyond scholarly conversation.

Finally, a synthesis of both sessions summarizes the impact of the conversations on the argument and points to areas for future development. In a field where most published thinking pretends to have polished answers, this documented process of conceptual and practical inquiry is itself a form of intellectual contribution.

---

The Center for the Future of Organization is based at the Drucker School of Management at Claremont Graduate University, and draws on Peter Drucker's foundational conviction that management is a liberal art, and that the most consequential thinking about organizations happens at the intersection of rigorous ideas, deep human understanding, and hard-won practical experience.

These papers are designed to honor that conviction.

## Featured Fellow Profile | Bernie Jaworski

---



**Bernie Jaworski** is the Drucker Chair in Management and the Liberal Arts, named in honor of Peter Drucker, the founder of modern management and the namesake of the Drucker School. The professorship is awarded to an internationally recognized scholar who carries on the Drucker legacy of tempering sound business practices with a commitment to social responsibility.

Jaworski spent a decade as a senior partner of the Monitor Group, a global management consulting firm. During his Monitor career, he co-founded and co-led two of the global practice areas, the e-commerce practice and the executive education unit. Among other activities, he was a senior team member of a number of significant multi-year corporate transformations for global clients in a variety of sectors, notably pharmaceuticals, biotech, hi-tech, and chemicals.

He served as a tenured full Professor of Marketing at the University of Southern California and was a member of the faculty at the University of Arizona and a visiting professor at Harvard Business School. He is the author/co-author of seven books including *Organic Growth Playbook* (2020), an American Marketing Association (AMA) book of the year, and – most recently, *The Soul of Strategy* (together with **David Sprott**, Dean of the Drucker School of Management)

Jaworski's and Sprott's "*The Soul of Strategy*," is also the intellectual foundation for the following "provocation": customer centricity is not a marketing orientation but a strategic and organizational capability, requiring four specific, evidence-based decisions that most organizations have never made explicitly, consistently, or in the right sequence. The paper examines that framework in dialogue.

# 1 | The Provocation

*The following provocation was written by Bernie Jaworski as the opening move in the CFFO Fellow Paper process. It appears here in its initial form, before peer critique or executive challenge. That is deliberate, so the Fellow's original thinking remains visible throughout, and the reader can trace what the process produced.*

---

## Customer Centricity – Four Big Decisions, Not Just One

March 5, 2026

By Bernie Jaworski

*based on theses from the book "The Soul of Strategy" by Bernie Jaworski and David Sprott*

Customer centricity has been studied extensively – over 6,000 scholarly articles discuss it – but there's surprisingly little agreement on what it actually means. In fact, more than 75 distinct definitions exist.

At the same time, few ideas in management have achieved broader acceptance. Almost every organization today claims to be customer-centric. And yet, in practice, customer centricity remains difficult to realize in any consistent or meaningful way.

This raises an important question: what does it truly mean to be customer-centric – and why does it remain so elusive?

Let's start with a definition:

**Customer centricity is an organization-wide effort to serve target segments by making evidence-based market choices that create mutual value.**

At first glance, parts of this may seem obvious. It is, after all, an organization-wide effort focused on key segments, guided by evidence-based decisions derived from customer insights. But what's less obvious – and more powerful – are the decisions that flow from these insights.

## Decision 1: How to Win

Most organizations equate customer centricity with product portfolios. Indeed, customer insights are often used to decide on new products, modify existing offerings, or eliminate outdated ones – the classic "how to win" decision. This also includes crafting value propositions to differentiate products in the eyes of the target segment.

To be clear, developing products that "fit" the needs of target segments better than competition is not easy. Most product and marketing plans focus heavily on how to differentiate from competition. The problem observed in practice is that most companies have the same insights – our customers want better, faster, or cheaper products. The key is to ask: what do we know about customer needs, that others do not know, that we can use to create differentiated offerings?

Yet focusing only on "how to win" misses three additional, equally important decisions: where to play, how to shape a market, and what to abandon. Where to play can provide competitive advantage, shaping markets positions a company as an industry leader, and disciplined abandonment of products or initiatives frees resources for the future. Together, these four choices define true customer centricity.

## Decision 2: Where to Play

Customer insights should guide decisions on segmenting markets and prioritizing target segments. The goal is not simply to follow the conventions and norms of the industry. The reason you gain unique customer insight is to segment markets differently than competition – not for the sake of being different, but because identification of underserved or unknown segments is a source of competitive advantage. Once unique segments are identified, value propositions are tailored to meet the specific needs of that segment rather than the market as a whole.

Southwest Airlines provides a classic example. Instead of segmenting by traditional class tiers, Southwest asked a different question: who is currently driving instead of flying? Their focus became short-haul travelers, price-sensitive customers, people valuing frequency and convenience over luxury, and customers who might otherwise take a car or bus. By framing the problem this way, Southwest created a strategy that targeted a specific customer group rather than following conventional categories.

Intuit took a similarly fresh approach. Traditional accounting software providers focused on accountants and businesses segmented by size. Intuit asked: what if the customer is not an accountant? Their segments included non-experts, small business owners who dislike accounting, and consumers intimidated by financial software. The concerns of these segments were more emotionally laden – anxiety about money, fear of making mistakes, feeling overwhelmed by taxes and accounting rules. Accordingly, the jobs to be done shifted: help me know if I can pay my bills; help me run my business without hiring a CFO; help me get through taxes without feeling stupid. By seeing the market differently, Intuit unlocked entirely new opportunities and redefined the customer experience.

### Decision 3: Shaping Markets

Once a company understands its customers deeply, it can move beyond serving them – it can reshape their behavior and the industry itself. Market leaders influence the rules of the game, uncover latent needs, and deliver offerings that encourage customers to change habits.

There are two basic ways to shape a market. First, one can shape the behaviors of players within the industry – Netflix enabled consumers to binge-watch; Walmart shaped the behaviors of suppliers. The second approach is to change the industry structure. Porter's Five Forces are not stable – they can be influenced by the actions of the firm. Companies like IKEA, Uber, Match.com, and Netflix changed both the behaviors of players and the structure of the industry itself.

NVIDIA reshaped the computing landscape. Initially known for gaming graphics, it repositioned GPUs as general-purpose parallel processors essential for AI, machine learning, and high-performance computing. Through its ecosystem, NVIDIA conditioned developers to build applications specifically for its architecture. As AI adoption grew, NVIDIA framed accelerated computing – not CPUs – as the standard, shaping both enterprise investment and developer behavior.

These examples show that shaping markets requires seeing beyond the immediate transaction – understanding how customer behavior and industry norms can evolve, and then leading that evolution.

## Decision 4: Abandonment

Customer centricity also involves deciding what to abandon. Products, practices, and initiatives that no longer serve customers or consume disproportionate resources must be let go. Firms have a very difficult time with abandonment. We call this competing in the past rather than competing in the future. Drucker framed the starting point of the abandonment exercise: if you were going to start your business all over again today – knowing what you now know – what would you do?

Microsoft illustrates disciplined abandonment. Under Satya Nadella, the company shifted from a Windows-first approach to a cloud-first, cross-platform strategy with Azure at the center. Windows Phone was deprioritized, Office became a subscription service, and software was released on competitors' platforms. Microsoft embraced open source, acquiring GitHub and supporting Linux in Azure – a cultural shift unimaginable in earlier eras.

BlackBerry, in contrast, demonstrates the cost of failing to abandon. Once dominant in enterprise smartphones, it clung to hardware keyboards, secure messaging, and enterprise IT buyers. When the market shifted toward touchscreens, app ecosystems, and consumer-driven design, BlackBerry was slow to pivot. The lesson is clear: capabilities that define success in one era can become constraints in the next. Disciplined systematic abandonment creates space for innovation and transformation.

## From Insight to Organizational and Ecosystem Reality

Taken together, these four decisions suggest that customer centricity is not a matter of marketing orientation, but of enterprise-wide strategic choice.

Yet this raises further challenges. These decisions must be translated into organizational structures, governance mechanisms, and leadership priorities. They often cut across functional boundaries, challenge existing incentives, and require coordination beyond the firm – across partners, platforms, and ecosystems that co-create customer value.

At the same time, customer insight becomes more abundant, particularly through data and AI, and ecosystem collaboration makes value creation more distributed. What does customer-centric mean in this context: who owns the customer relationship, and how is customer value defined when multiple actors are involved?

Customer centricity may be far more complex than commonly assumed.

## 2 | What the Dialogue Produced

*The provocation was tested in two structured conversations – first with a cross-disciplinary group of CFFO Fellows and experts, then with senior executives from energy, pharmaceuticals, automotive, banking, technology, mining, insurance, and brand strategy. What follows is not a summary of those conversations but an account of what they added - insights that are not in the provocation, that extend or challenge it, and that sharpen the argument.*

---

### The Strategy Field's Blind Spot

There is a structural reason why so many organizations claim customer centricity without achieving it, and it runs deeper than culture or capability. The frameworks most executives use to make strategic decisions were not built around customers. They were built around competitors and capabilities – and customers appear in those frameworks mostly as the audience for decisions already made elsewhere.

This is not a recent oversight. For decades, the dominant schools of strategy asked two questions: what are rivals doing, and what does the firm uniquely possess? The resource-based view of the firm – one of the field's most influential frameworks – treats competitive advantage as a function of assets that are rare, valuable, and hard to copy. The customer is the beneficiary of those assets, not the starting point for determining which assets to build. A review of 130 academic articles on the resource-based view found the customer mentioned just once across all of them. That is not an accident of terminology. It reflects a deep assumption about where strategy begins.

The consequence is predictable. The four decisions the provocation describes – how to win, where to play, how to shape markets, what to abandon – have typically been made with capabilities and competitors at the center and customers at the margin. Jaworski and Sprott's argument is that reversing this sequence changes everything downstream. Start with a genuine understanding of what specific customers need, and what competitors have missed about that need. Then decide which capabilities to build and where to compete. The resource-based view does not disappear from this logic. It is just no longer the origin of it.

This reframing also changes what counts as a useful strategic question. It is not: what are we uniquely good at? It is: what does a specific group of customers need that nobody else has yet understood – and what would we need to build to serve that better than anyone else?

## Measuring the Wrong Things

If customer centricity is fundamentally about decisions, most organizations are measuring the wrong things. Net Promoter Scores (NPS), satisfaction surveys, and loyalty metrics track outcomes – whether customers were pleased after an interaction. They say nothing about whether the four decisions were made on genuine customer evidence or on assumptions that happened to produce an acceptable result.

An organization can improve its NPS consistently while making every strategic decision on the basis of what it already believes about its customers. The score improves; the practice never changes. Outcome metrics tell you whether customers are satisfied with the current experience. They say nothing about whether strategic drift is quietly underway – or whether the organization is learning anything it did not already know.

This distinction leads to a harder diagnostic question than most organizations ask of themselves: **when did our customer insights last lead us to make a decision we would not otherwise have made?**

The deeper problem is that even organizations investing seriously in customer research often design it to produce familiar answers. Organizations frame research questions within their existing mental models and readily embrace findings that confirm what they already believe. When evidence points in a different direction, leaders challenge the methodology, question the sample, or commission yet another study. Research thus becomes less a vehicle for inquiry and more a mechanism for validating decisions that have effectively been made already.

Consider the difference a genuine inquiry can make: a cosmetics company discovered through in-store observation that teenage shoppers who sampled the product at point of sale purchased it 76 percent of the time, compared to 12 percent for those who did not. That single finding dismantled the company's entire media and celebrity endorsement strategy, which had absorbed a large share of the marketing budget and had almost no bearing on the actual purchase decision. The insight was not produced by more sophisticated analytics. It was produced by deciding to observe rather than survey, and by an organization willing to accept a finding that contradicted what everyone in the room had assumed.

***The right question to ask of any customer research program is not: what did we learn? It is: what would we do differently as a result that we would not have done otherwise?***

## Before the Decisions: Orientation and Willingness

The provocation treats the difficulty of customer centricity primarily as a process and organizational design challenge. Both conversations pushed back on that framing.

The Fellow's discussion identified organizational willingness as the binding constraint. Most organizations are not genuinely trying to learn something they do not already know about their customers. As mentioned above, they are trying to confirm what they already believe. This plays out across all four decisions. Value propositions get designed around what the organization knows how to deliver. Segments get defined by industry convention. Market shaping tracks visible trends and calls it foresight. The products most in need of abandonment are protected by the people who built them.

Drucker's concept of the theory of the business is useful here. Every organization operates on assumptions about its environment, its purpose, and the nature of the value it creates. When those assumptions fit reality, the organization performs. When they drift out of alignment and go unexamined, performance suffers. When this happens, the organization often cannot diagnose why, because the assumptions themselves are invisible to the people who hold them. Customer centricity is what holds those assumptions accountable. But it depends on a prior condition: a leadership culture genuinely willing to hear something that contradicts what it already believes. That willingness cannot be installed through a better survey instrument. It is a cultural and leadership prerequisite.

The executive conversation added a structural dimension to this argument. Case in point: the transformational dynamics of the energy sector. Traditional companies built strategy around large capital assets and centralized infrastructure – resources customers could not easily replicate and therefore depended on entirely. The logic was self-reinforcing: customers came to you; you did not need to go to them. The energy transition is dismantling that logic. As renewable energy becomes decentralized and lighter on capital, customers can increasingly build solutions themselves. The organizations gaining ground are largely those without legacy. They are free to ask what customers actually need rather than what the existing asset base can deliver. The challenge, as one executive put it, is that successful corporations develop antibodies that prevent curiosity. The companies that are truly transforming the energy space mostly come from outside.

A further dimension came from the observation that business has been searching for a silver bullet to replace human judgment for decades. Nielsen ratings were supposed to solve the interpretation problem. Then big data and click stream analytics. Now we have AI as the ultimate source of inquiry. Each wave has produced more data without adding

genuine insight, because the data gets processed through the same assumptions the organization already held. The prior condition for customer centricity is not a better research methodology. It is an orientation toward the other: a genuine curiosity about what customers experience, need, and are moving toward, as opposed to what the organization hopes or expects.

This orientation problem is sharper in B2B contexts than the provocation acknowledges. In most complex selling environments, there are at least two customers: the buyer who controls the budget, and the end user whose behavior ultimately determines whether value is created. Most B2B organizations invest heavily in understanding the former and systematically neglect the latter. That is a strategic error with compounding consequences. Insight about end users – where they are going, what they are beginning to expect, what problems they have not yet articulated – changes the power dynamics in a value chain entirely. An organization that understands the end user's trajectory better than its immediate customer does has a structural advantage in every negotiation.

***An organization that only accepts customer insight when it confirms what it already believes is not doing customer research. It is doing expensive reassurance.***

## The Abandonment Paradox

No part of the framework generated more engagement than the fourth decision. Letting go is hard, and the conversation explored in-depth why abandonment is so difficult.

The core paradox: the case for abandonment is usually clearest when it is also hardest to act on. Nespresso executed with genuine customer centricity for two decades, built an exceptionally loyal core segment, and then missed a generational shift in how younger consumers think about caffeine and the occasions around which they consume it. The failure was not a lack of customer data. It was the near-impossibility of acting on data that challenged a model still delivering results, still meeting quarterly targets, still supported by a growing core market. There is always a voice in the room making the argument that the core market is still growing, the future segment is uncertain, and perhaps things will continue as they are. That argument is not irrational in the short term. It is wrong in the long run.

Uncertainty compounds the problem. At a moment when AI is reshaping what customers expect and which business models are viable, the evidence base for committing to a new direction is naturally thinner than the evidence base for defending the existing one. Waiting for certainty that may never arrive is itself a strategic choice - and usually a losing one. The organizations navigating this best are not those that have found ways to

reduce the uncertainty. They are those that take a clear point of view about where the market is going and commit resources behind it, even before they have conclusive evidence.

The executive conversation also touched on the structural conditions that make abandonment more or less achievable. Open-mindedness about letting go is considerably easier in a growth context where new opportunities are captured, than in a mature one where success has created its own defenses. One executive described building an HR function for a newly acquired distressed asset, where doing things differently is no great cultural achievement; it is simply the only option available. Legacy organizations face a different and harder problem. The antibodies against change are rational responses to prior success which require deliberate structural countermeasures.

A typical response to this challenge is a skunk works or innovation unit peeled off from the core. This can work, but only with genuine senior sponsorship and a steering committee that stays engaged and provides organizational cover. Without that, the initiative gets starved by a system never fully committed to it. Drucker's alternative - go two or three levels down and let the people who will run the future organization reinvent it - requires the same condition. Middle managers cannot sustain this effort without senior cover.

A process of staged experimentation emerged as the most promising mechanism. It starts with structured pilots that test specific hypotheses with clear criteria for what would constitute sufficient evidence to justify scale. Ideally, this is designed as a co-creation exercise with lead customers, which yields multiple benefits: The quality of insight is higher because customers are co-generating it, organizational commitment is more durable because the solution arrives with external advocates, and the valley of doubt is shorter because early customers have been part of building what the broader organization is eventually asked to adopt.

***Every significant transformation passes through a valley of doubt – a phase where the new direction is not yet proven and the old one still looks defensible. How leadership behaves in that valley usually determines the outcome more than the quality of the strategy that preceded it.***

## The System Beyond the Customer

The provocation frames customer centricity as creating mutual value between an organization and its customers. The executive conversation extended this to an ecosystem perspective, illustrated by multiple examples:

In pharmaceuticals, a therapy optimal for the patient but unacceptable to the insurer does not reach the patient. In energy, a solution that works for the end user but creates unacceptable costs for grid operators does not scale. In financial services, a model that serves clients well but sits outside what the regulatory environment will sustain does not survive.

In a nutshell: The customer cannot be served well if the broader system that delivers value to the customer is not also taken into consideration. This is not a complication of customer centricity. It is what customer centricity actually requires in complex industries. The question shifts from "what does the customer need?" to "what has to happen across the wider system for those needs to be met?"

The response to this challenge extended the framework by emphasizing that the goal is not customer centricity in isolation but mutual value. Organizations need to create viable outcomes for all the actors whose cooperation is required to deliver value to the customer. If the end customer wins but other players in the system lose, the solution will not hold. Designing for the system is not an alternative to customer centricity; it is the precondition for it.

What this looks like in practice is sometimes surprising. An organization working on logistics and climate challenges discovered that its most valuable capability was not its physical infrastructure but its ability to convene different actors - logistics companies, energy providers, climate innovators, government agencies - around a shared problem that none could solve alone. The competitive advantage was the convening function itself. It did not emerge from a customer-centric analysis in the conventional sense. It emerged from asking what the whole system needed, and from recognizing that no single actor within it could provide the answer alone.

This points toward an increasingly important organizational capability: the ability to facilitate coordination among actors whose interests overlap without fully converging. Organizations create value not only through what they produce but through their ability to bring the right actors together around the right problem. In many industries, that convening function is emerging as a distinct and durable source of competitive advantage that appears on no balance sheet and cannot be acquired.

## From Insight to Decision

The final theme was the most operational, and in some ways the most immediately useful. All the analytical capability in the world does not change organizational direction if insight cannot travel from the people who observe customers to the people who decide strategy.

In most organizations, those two populations are structurally separated. The people closest to customers – frontline staff, account managers, service functions – encounter changing needs and shifting expectations in real time. But strategic decisions are made at some distance from these interactions, by people whose calendars are largely occupied with internal meetings. Information moves through layers of interpretation before it reaches anyone with authority to act on it. By the time it arrives, what began as a nuanced observation about a customer's situation has been compressed into a data point that can be managed and compared. Something is lost in that process, and it is usually the thing that made the insight useful.

The solution is simple yet consistently underused in practice: make evidence the currency of internal argument. When a team brings genuine customer data to a strategic decision, data that is actionable, distinctive, and economically significant, it changes the nature of the debate. Opinions alone don't count anymore; those who want to decide differently must also bring evidence. Management judgment and organizational seniority remain relevant, but they are no longer sufficient to override what the market is showing. The burden of proof shifts.

The cosmetics case we mentioned illustrates the mechanism. The finding about in-store sampling did not succeed because someone argued more persuasively. It succeeded because the evidence was unambiguous and the counter-argument could not be made with equivalent data. When evidence is strong enough, the debate changes character. It moves from a negotiation between competing intuitions to a negotiation between competing interpretations of shared facts. It becomes a much more productive argument.

Trust is the underlying condition that makes this possible at all. In markets where competitive dynamics are constrained and customer relationships are historically transactional, organizations can mistake proximity for understanding. Real customer insight reveals what customers actually need rather than what they assume a supplier can provide. Getting it depends on trust built through interactions in which customers feel heard rather than being processed via surveys. That trust accumulates slowly. It cannot be manufactured by deploying a better data platform or a more sophisticated CRM system. It has to be earned through the quality of repeated engagement.

## 3 | Open Questions

Good frameworks do not just provide answers, they provoke questions. The dialogue highlighted three key challenges that leaders who are serious about customer centricity will eventually have to face:

- **How do you govern for customer centricity?**  
The framework specifies what decisions need to be made and on what basis. It does not yet specify who owns them, how conflicts between customer evidence and organizational inertia get adjudicated, or what structural mechanisms actually enable insight to travel from the people who observe customers to the people who decide strategy. Most organizations have no answer to this. The ones that do tend to outperform those that don't.
  - **How do you act in the ecosystem without a map?**  
The mutual value argument is undisputed. What remains open is how organizations identify the relevant boundaries of their stakeholder system, how they develop convening capability, and how they navigate genuine conflicts of interest between stakeholders. These are not theoretical questions. They are the daily reality of organizations who act in complex relationship networks.
  - **How do you create willingness?**  
This is the most urgent question, because it determines whether any of the rest is achievable. What leadership behaviors, organizational structures, and development investments actually cultivate genuine willingness to learn something uncomfortable – at scale, under competitive pressure, over time? The framework makes this question urgent. It does not answer it.
-

## Three Questions for Executives

For an executive the most useful thing is not a summary. We close this paper with a provocation of a different kind:

Based on our discussions, ask these three questions in your own organization this week:

- **When did customer insight last lead you to make a decision you would not otherwise have made – and was that decision uncomfortable for someone?** If you cannot answer that question, the issue is probably not your research program. It is your willingness to act on what it shows.
  - **Is your where-to-play decision based on industry convention or on something your competitors have genuinely missed?** Most segmentation reflects how the organization sees itself, not how the market actually works. The gap between the two is where competitive advantage lives.
  - **If you were starting your business today, knowing what you now know, what would you not do?** Peter Drucker asked this question decades ago. Most leadership teams still cannot answer it honestly because the honest answer threatens the protectors of legacy systems. That is not a reason to avoid the question. It is the reason to ask it.
-

# Contributors

---

## 1 | The Provocation

- **Bernie Jaworski** | Peter F. Drucker Chair in Management and the Liberal Arts, Drucker School of Management, Claremont Graduate University

## 2 | Input from CFFO Fellows and Senior Experts

- **Arvind Bhambri** | Professor of Strategy and Leadership, USC Marshall School of Business
- **Azita Arvani** | Independent Board Director; former CEO, Rakuten Symphony Americas
- **Bob Pickard** | Principal, Leadership Communication, Inc.
- **Eve Psalti** | General Manager, Microsoft Azure AI Foundry
- **Joseph Pistrui** | Professor of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, IE University
- **Markus Webhofer** | CEO Institute of Brand Logic
- **Roddy Millar** | Founder and CEO, Ideas for Leaders
- **Roland Deiser** | Drucker Senior Fellow, Founder and Chairman, CFFO

## 3 | Executive Input and Contextualization

- **Alma Derricks** | Founder REV; former Head Global Sales & Marketing, Cirque du Soleil (USA)
- **Carlos Barrasa** | Executive Vice President Commercial & Clean Energies, Moeve (Spain)
- **Eve Psalti** | General Manager, Microsoft Azure AI Foundry (USA)
- **Francisco Valle** | Founder, Valle Consulting (USA)
- **Harry Lim** | Future Development Lead, Novartis (China)
- **Marlow Hudson** | Head of Customer Experience & Voice of the Customer, Stellantis (USA)
- **Nandani Lynton** | Head of Change & Culture Transformation, SAP (Germany/USA)
- **Peter Spannagl** | Global Talent Management, Learning, and Training, Bayer (Germany)
- **Ricardo Ferreira** | MD, Access Bank (Angola)
- **Rosina Gasteiger** | Head of HR for Sales & Marketing, BMW / Mini / Rolls-Royce (Germany)
- **Saar Ben-Attar** | Managing Director, Ascent Growth Partners (South Africa)
- **Thomas Kirste** | Director Bosch Management Consulting, Business Innovation (Germany)
- **Ulrich Tennie** | CHRO, MNK Group (United Kingdom)
- **Valentina Satarova** | Head of Corporate University, Eurasia Resource Group (Kazakhstan)